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TRACEY MACLIN
BYRD V UNITED STATES: UNAUTHORIZED
DRIVERS OF RENTAL CARS HAVE FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? NOT AS EVIDENT
AS IT SEEMS
No discerning student of the Supreme Court would contend that
Justice Anthony Kennedy broadly interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment during his thirty years on theCourt. For example, inMaryland v
King,1 a 2013 case that Justice Samuel Alito described as “perhaps the
most important criminal case that this Court has heard in decades,”2
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rejected a Fourth Amendment
challenge to a Maryland law requiring forensic testing of DNA sam-
ples taken frompersons arrested for violent crimes.Kingwas criticized
by individuals and organizations across the political spectrum,3 and it
Tracey Maclin is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Author’s note: Thanks to Al Alschuler and Gary Lawson for reading and commenting on
a draft of this article. And thanks to Sanjana Dubey and Julia Harper for their research and
editing assistance.
1 569 US 435 (2013).
2 Transcript of Oral Argument, Maryland v King, No 12-207, at 35 (Feb 27, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/ZD4J-58YU.
3 Conservative Republican Senators Rand Paul and Ted Cruz, the New York Times editorial
pages, the American Prospect, and the American Civil Liberties Union all denounced King. See
Rand Paul, Big Brother Says “Open Your Mouth!” (American Conservative, June 10, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/4YRJ-F4BW; Ted Cruz, Statement on SCOTUS Decision in
Maryland v. King ( June 3, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/C75J-WKLD; Editorial, DNA
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has been characterized as “a watershed moment in the evolution of
Fourth Amendment doctrine and an important signal for the future of
biotechnologies and policing.”4
A decade before King was announced, Justice Kennedy wrote for a
majority of the Court in another controversial case dealing with po-
lice bus sweeps for drugs and guns.Drayton v United States5 addressed
whether passengers on an interstate bus were seized when police
approached, asked for identification, and requested permission to
search their bodies and luggage for weapons or illegal narcotics, and
whether police must inform persons of their right to refuse to co-
operate to validate a consent search.6 Drayton and Brown were com-
panions seated on a bus when officers questioned them and asked to
search their luggage and persons at a rest stop. After narcotics were
discovered on Brown, an officer said to Drayton, “Mind if I check
you?”7 Without a verbal response, Drayton lifted his hands above his
legs, which allowed the officer to pat down his legs and detect nar-
cotics concealed underneath his pants. Kennedy concluded that no
seizure had occurred, and that police need not inform passengers of
their rights when requesting consent to search because it is the re-
sponsibility of citizens to know and assert their rights if they wish not
to cooperate.8
Lastly, consider Justice Kennedy’s position on the exclusionary
rule, which requires the suppression of evidence obtained by police in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In contrast to other “moderate”
and Suspicionless Searches, NY Times A24 ( June 4, 2013); Scott Lemieux, Scalia Gets It Right
(American Prospect, June 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/55L8-SG8K; American Civil
Liberties Union, Comment on Supreme Court DNA Swab Ruling (Maryland v. King ) ( June 3,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4XF6-M9LN. More recently, Barry Friedman stated that
the “decision in King is built on a lie.” Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing Without Per-
mission 274 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017) (noting that King justified its result because of
the State’s interest in “identifying” arrestees, but identification had nothing to do with why
the State takes DNA samples; “the DNA of arrestees is being checked to solve cold cases”).
4 Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127
Harv L Rev 161, 161 (2013). See also Tracey Maclin, Maryland v King: Terry v Ohio Redux,
2013 Supreme Court Review 359, 402–3 (noting that the logic of King “invites law en-
forcement officials to extend DNA searches to persons arrested for any offense and even to
persons merely detained by the police”).
5 536 US 194 (2002).
6 Id at 203.
7 Id at 199.
8 Id at 207. See Tracey Maclin, The Good and the Bad News About Consent Searches in the
Supreme Court, 39 McGeorge L Rev 27, 63–65 (2008); Janice Nader, No Need to Shout: Bus
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Supreme Court Review 153, 179.
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conservative Justices who have recently sat on the Court, Justice
Kennedy has never voted to apply the exclusionary rule in a case in
which the scope of the rule was contested in a search and seizure case.9
Tellingly, he provided the fifth vote and concurred in the three key
sections of Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Hudson v Michigan,10
which held that suppression is never a remedy for knock-and-
announce violations.11 Academic commentators generally agree that
Hudson is a direct attack on the exclusionary rule from several per-
spectives and lays the foundation for abolishing the rule as a cate-
gorical matter.12 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in
Hudson in which he stated that “the continued operation of the ex-
clusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in
doubt.”13 Justice Kennedy’s cryptic comment raised several ques-
9 See Tracey Maclin, The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule 346
(Oxford, 2013). Justice Kennedy’s votes in exclusionary-rule cases put him in the company of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito who have also never voted to
apply the exclusionary rule. By comparison, Justices O’Connor and Souter, neither of whom
championed the exclusionary rule, voted to enforce the rule at least once during their tenure
on the Court. O’Connor voted for the defendant in Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340 (1987), and in
Murray v United States, 487 US 533 (1988) (O’Connor joined Justice Marshall’s dissent),
while Souter voted for the defendant in Pennsylvania Bd of Probation & Parole v Scott, 524 US
357 (1998).
10 547 US 586 (2006).
11 Id at 589.
12 Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.6(h) at
281 (West, 5th ed 2012) (arguing that Hudson’s cost-benefits analysis was “dead wrong, but
also that it has the capacity to metastasize into a much broader limitation upon the sup-
pression doctrine”); Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v.
Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 Iowa L Rev 1741, 1764 (2008) (describing Hudson’s attenuation
theory as a “formula for abolishing the [exclusionary] rule”); Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrel-
evancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 Chi Kent L Rev 191, 202 (2010)
(stating that at its “most fundamental level,” the result in Hudson “called into question the
future of the exclusionary rule,” and that abolition of the rule “is Scalia’s clear aim; he has
planted the seeds in Hudson and needs one more vote to reap the harvest”); James J.
Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 Iowa L Rev
1819, 1841–47 (2008) (stating that when read broadly, Hudson “foreshadows and anticipates
outright abolition” of the exclusionary rule). See also Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment,
the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-
Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 Chi Kent L Rev 209, 210 (2010); David A. Moran, The End of
Waiting for the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth
Amendment, 2006 Cato S Ct Rev 283; Sharon L. Davies and Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age
of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 UC Davis L Rev
1035 (2008). Recently, in Collins v Virginia, 138 S Ct 1663 (2018), Justice Thomas questioned
the Court’s power to impose the exclusionary rule on the states. Id at 1675–80 (Thomas, J,
concurring) (explaining first that the exclusionary rule “is not rooted in the Constitution or a
federal statute” or federal common law, then stating skepticism that the Court has the au-
thority to impose the rule on the states).
13 Hudson, 547 US at 603 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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tions, including why someone who claims to support the “continuing
vitality of the exclusionary rule . . . would cast the crucial fifth vote for
an opinion that openly declared war on the exclusionary rule.”14
In light of his previous votes in search and seizure cases, surpris-
ingly Justice Kennedy, in what would be his final Fourth Amendment
opinion for a majority of the Court, authored an opinion in favor of a
criminal defendant. In Byrd v United States,15 a unanimous Court re-
jected the government’s argument that unauthorized drivers always
lack an expectation of privacy in a rental car and thus can never
challenge a police search of the car.16 Byrd was driving a rental car in
violation of the rental agreement but with the permission of the
renter; the police searched the trunk of the car, allegedly without
consent or probable cause, and found heroin and body armor. The
Court in Byrd held that the search was unlawful because “as a general
rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental
car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental
agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver.”17
When Byrd arrived at the Court, few would have predicted a vic-
tory for Terrence Byrd, let alone a unanimous vote for the defense.
Even apart from the Court’s general antagonism to Fourth Amend-
ment claims, too many obstacles stood in the way of a victory for
Byrd.18 First, the federal appellate courts had split three ways on
whether an unauthorized driver of a rental car could raise a consti-
tutional challenge to a police search.19 A majority of the court of
appeals—the Third, Fourth, Fifth, andTenthCircuits—had adopted
a bright-line rule that unauthorized drivers lacked standing to contest
14 Moran, 2006 Cato S Ct Rev at 308 (cited in note 12).
15 138 S Ct 1518 (2018).
16 Id at 1522.
17 Id at 1524. In the final section of the opinion, the holding was framed without the caveat:
“the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the
rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id at
1531.
18 Byrd had the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car.
See Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98, 104 (1980).
19 See Darren M. Goldman, Note, Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split: Why Unauthorized
Rental Drivers Should Be Denied Fourth Amendment Standing, 89 BU L Rev 1687 (2009); Lisa J.
Zigterman, Note, Live and Let Drive: The Struggle for Unauthorized Drivers of Rental Cars in
Attaining Standing to Challenge Fourth Amendment Searches, 2009 U Ill L Rev 1655; Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Byrd v United States, Docket No 16-1371, ∗11–18 (US filed May 11,
2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 2130318) (“Byrd Cert Brief”).
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a search.20 By contrast, in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, “an unau-
thorized driver always had standing to challenge a search, so long
as the unauthorized driver had the permission of an authorized
driver.”21 In these circuits, the rental contract between the authorized
driver and the rental company was irrelevant to the standing issue;
what mattered most was whether the driver had permission from the
authorized driver.22 Although the approach of the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits could also be characterized as a bright-line rule—that is, the
unauthorized driver always has standing when he has the permission
of the authorized driver—that directive lacked clarity for both police
and judges attempting to apply it.23 Finally, the Sixth Circuit an-
nounced a third rule.While recognizing an initial presumption against
standing, the Sixth Circuit embraced a totality of the circumstances
test to decide whether an unauthorized driver had standing.24
Another apparent impediment for Byrd was the result and rea-
soning of Rakas v Illinois.25 Frank Rakas and Lonnie King were pas-
sengers in a vehicle that was the suspected getaway car in a robbery.
After police lawfully stopped the car, a search revealed a box of rifle
shells in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under-
neath the front passenger seat. Neither passenger claimed ownership
of the vehicle or the rifle or the shells.26 When these items were in-
20 United States v Kennedy, 638 F3d 159, 165 (3d Cir 2011); United States v Wellons, 32 F3d
117, 119 (4th Cir 1994); United States v Seely, 331 F3d 471, 472 (5th Cir 2003) (per curiam);
United States v Roper, 918 F2d 885, 887–88 (10th Cir 1990).
21 Goldman, 89 BU L Rev at 1708 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 19).
22 Id at 1711.
23 For example, “the test does not define what ‘permission’ is, or how it is proven.” Id at
1719. Would police “be required to contact the authorized driver or could the officer just
take the unauthorized driver’s word?” Id. In other words, the test of the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits “fails to accomplish its intended goal—ease of use.” Id.
24 United States v Smith, 263 F3d 571 (6th Cir 2001). Five factors were considered by the
court: (1) whether the unauthorized driver had a valid driver’s license; (2) whether the un-
authorized driver was able to proffer the rental agreement and had sufficient knowledge
about the vehicle and the circumstances surrounding the rental; (3) the nexus between the
authorized driver and unauthorized driver; (4) whether the unauthorized driver had per-
mission to drive the vehicle from the authorized driver; and (5) whether the unauthorized
driver had a business relationship with the rental company. Id at 586. See also United States v
Winters, 782 F3d 289, 300–01 (6th Cir 2015) (reaffirming the test from Smith and stating that
the fact that the defendants were not listed on the rental car agreement was “entitled to some
weight” in the totality of the circumstances analysis).
25 439 US 128 (1978).
26 Why the defendants never asserted a property interest in the rifle or the shells remains a
mystery. Shortly after Rakas was decided, Professor Kamisar offered the following specula-
tion:
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troduced at trial, the Illinois courts ruled that the defendants lacked
standing to contest the search. The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that passengers’ lawful presence in a vehicle was not enough, by itself,
to confer standing. Rakas explained that because neither Rakas nor
King had a property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the items,
they failed to prove they held a Fourth Amendment privacy interest
in the glove compartment or in the area under the front seat. “Like
the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua
passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of
privacy.”27 InByrd, the government argued thatRakas precluded Byrd
from claiming a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car that
he neither owned nor leased.28 While Byrd’s presence in the vehicle
was legitimate since he had obtained the keys from the authorized
driver, Rakas instructed that legitimate presence “is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, foundation for asserting FourthAmendment rights.”29
Another seeming hurdle for Byrd was that his case would rise or fall
on whether he had standing.30 In the typical search and seizure case,
Recall that at the suppression hearing the defense lawyer maintained that his client
did not “have to admit” that the items seized were theirs. The way he put that
suggests that perhaps the defense lawyer was unaware that testimony given to es-
tablish standing to object to illegally seized evidence may not be used against the
defendant at his trial on the question of guilt or innocence. [See Simmons v United
States, 390 US 377 (1968).]
On the other hand, perhaps the defense lawyer was thinking of putting his client
on the stand at the trial and was painfully aware that in a few jurisdictions, including
Illinois, a defendant’s testimony at his pretrial hearing to suppress illegally seized
evidence has been admissible for impeachment purposes if and when the defendant
testifies at his trial. In these jurisdictions, Simmons has been modified in light of
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which allows statements obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda to be introduced at trial for impeachment purposes.
See Jesse H. Choper, Yale Kamisar, and Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court: Trends and
Developments 163–64 (National Practice Institute, 1979) (remarks of Professor Kamisar).
27 Rakas, 429 US at 149.
28 See Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1522.
29 Brief for the United States, Byrd v United States, Docket No 16-1371, ∗14 (US filed Dec 13,
2017) (“Government Brief ”).
30 Rakas merged the issue of standing with the substantive merits of a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment claims. In future cases, Rakas explained that “the better analysis forthrightly
focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather
than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.” Rakas,
439 US at 139. Interestingly, a year later the Court used the term “standing” notwithstanding
what was said in Rakas. See Arkansas v Sanders, 442 US 753, 761 n 8 (1979). Despite Rakas’s
instruction, courts still analyze defendants’ Fourth Amendment claims under the standing
rubric, as did the lower courts in Byrd’s case. United States v Byrd, 679 Fed Appx 146, 150 (3d
Cir 2015). United States v Byrd, 2015 WL 5038455, ∗2 (MD Pa 2015). As Orin Kerr observes,
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standing is not an issue. Police illegally enter A’s home and seize
criminal evidence.Or, police illegally friskB and discover a weapon in
his pocket.A clearly has a basis to contest the intrusion because police
entered his home, as does B because police searched his person. “The
basic rule of standing is that a litigant may assert only a violation of his
own fourth amendment rights.”31 But in cases where a defendant’s
nexus to a challenged search or seizure is attenuated or illegitimate,
the concept of standing becomes important and sometimes contro-
versial. The Court has left no doubt that the car thief or the “burglar
plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season”32 lacks
standing to contest what would otherwise be an illegal police search
because their presence in the stolen vehicle or the cabin is illegal or
“wrongful.”33
Furthermore, lengthy history exists on the interplay of standing
and the exclusionary rule. Opponents of the exclusionary rule are
generally averse to grant standing to criminal defendants to contest a
search or seizure. The best evidence of this phenomenon emerged
after the onset of the exclusionary rule. In 1914,Weeks vUnited States34
ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
was inadmissible in federal court.35 “Almost immediately thereafter
lower federal courts began to develop a limitation on the applicability
of the exclusionary rule that has become known as the ‘standing’ re-
quirement.”36 Seven years later, one scholar noted that the standing
“judges, practitioners, and academics still talk about standing . . . because the issue of whose
rights are being violated is a conceptually distinct question from whether anyone at all has
Fourth Amendment rights.” Orin Kerr, Four Thoughts on Byrd v. United States (Volokh
Conspiracy, Jan 2, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/G78Y-63QN. Forty years after Rakas
explained that notions of standing were unnecessary and unhelpful for deciding search and
seizure cases, the Court now agrees that “[t]he concept of standing in Fourth Amendment
cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitu-
tional search.” Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1530.
31 Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 NIU L Rev 1, 4
(1983).
32 Rakas, 439 US at 143 n 12.
33 Jones v United States, 362 US 257, 267 (1960) (explaining that anyone “legitimately on
premises where a search occurred may challenge its legality” when evidence obtained from
the search is offered against him, but distinguishing those “who, by virtue of their wrongful
presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched”).
34 232 US 383 (1914).
35 Id at 398.
36 Richard B. Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing
Cases, 65 Iowa L Rev 493, 493 (1980) (citation omitted). While the “precise origins of
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doctrine permitted the government to profit from unconstitutional
searches.37 In cases where a defendant’s basis for contesting a search is
debatable, conferring standing to a particular defendant “is solely for
the purpose of determining whether evidence unlawfully obtained
should be excluded at trial.”38 For jurists opposed to suppressing il-
legally obtained evidence, standing is a gateway to invoking exclusion
and thus should be discouraged whenever possible.
The interplay between standing and the exclusionary rule was clearly
on the minds of some Justices in Rakas.39 Then-Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion for the majority pointedly noted that “[c]onferring standing
to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean
a more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during crim-
inal trials.”40 Rehnquist also stated that “misgivings as to the benefit of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly
considered when deciding whether to expand standing to assert
Fourth Amendment violations.”41 Since Rakas, the Court has been
even less willing to enforce exclusion as a remedy. Thus, Byrd would
have to persuade a Court openly hostile to the exclusionary rule that
he should be afforded standing.
the fourth amendment standing requirement are unclear,” Professor Kuhns believes that the
“[f]irst and perhaps most important[ ]” factor in the development of the concept of standing was
that it “provided courts that were disenchanted with the exclusionary rule with a means of
limiting the scope of the rule.” Id at 504 n 78, citing Richard A. Edwards, Standing to Suppress
Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw U L Rev 471, 472 (1952).
37 Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 Harv L Rev 361, 375 (1921).
38 Welsh S. White and Robert S. Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U
Pa L Rev 333, 356 (1970). See also William A. Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth
Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo L Rev 1 (1975) (“In the
past, the Court has often used language which refers to standing to challenge or the scope of
the amendment when it is really deciding whether a specific remedy—the exclusionary rule—
should be available.”) (footnote omitted); Kuhns, 65 Iowa L Rev at 505 (cited in note 36) (“[I]n
contrast to a substantive holding that a particular search or seizure is unconstitutional . . .
standing cases involve an attempt to preclude a defendant from invoking the exclusionary rule.”).
39 The first sentence of Justice Harry Blackmun’s pre-argument memo to himself read:
“This case focuses on the exclusionary rule and raises an issue as to its expansion.” Harry A.
Blackmun, Pre-Argument Memorandum on Rakas v Illinois, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box
290, Folder 3, Manuscript Division, US Library of Congress (on file with Library of Con-
gress). Likewise, in his pre-argument memo Justice Lewis Powell noted that if the defendants’
standing argument prevailed “the result would be a major extension of the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule.”Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers,Washington and Lee School of Law, Box 60. Finally,
during the Justices’ conference discussion, Chief Justice Burger remarked that the “only issue is
standing.” Powell Papers, Box 60.
40 Rakas, 439 US at 137.
41 Id at 138 (footnote omitted).
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Finally, Byrd needed to propose a constitutional test, preferably a
workable bright-line rule that would not be too restrictive of police
interests, that would resolve his and future cases. As discussed above,
Rakas foreclosed legitimate presence in the car as a proxy for Fourth
Amendment protection. Moreover, for Justices inclined to a textual
interpretation of the Constitution, Byrd needed to address the fact
that the Fourth Amendment protects people in “their” effects.42 Byrd
could not assert the constitutional rights of the authorized driver
because Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vi-
cariously asserted.43 Thus, Byrd’s test had to show why an unautho-
rized driver could nonetheless claim a vehicle that he neither owned
nor leased was “his” under the Fourth Amendment.
In an attempt to prove his point, counsel for Byrd stated during
oral argument that his client “ha[d] the right to exclude others” from
the rental car which “bolsters also [Byrd’s] reasonable expectation of
privacy”44 in the car. Counsel then accepted Justice Stephen Breyer’s
characterization of the rule Byrd was proposing: “A person who has
possession of and is [the] driver of a car, whoever he is, has a rea-
sonable expectation in privacy of the parts of the car, unless in driving
or possessing it or—he’s committing a crime.”45 This test emphasizes
Byrd’s possession and control of the vehicle. A few moments later,
however, counsel seemed to offer a different test that emphasized the
privacy of items stored in a closed vehicle.When Justice Elena Kagan
asked why society should consider Byrd’s conduct reasonable, coun-
sel responded: “Because society recognizes that when you put your
personal items in a locked space . . . you have an expectation of privacy
regarding it.”46 Counsel never reconciled the differences in these for-
mulations.
42 US Const, Amend IV.
43 Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 171 (1969) (“The established principle is that
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only
by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely
by the introduction of damaging evidence.”); id at 174 (“Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”)
(citations omitted).
44 Transcript of Oral Argument, Byrd v United States, Docket No 16-1317 at 27 ( Jan 9,
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/MK9V-TFXN.
45 Id. At the end of the oral argument, counsel for Byrd restated his proposed bright-line rule.
“This Court should adopt a clear bright-line rule that unless you’re a criminal trespasser, unless
you’re a car thief, that you have at least the ability to invoke the Fourth Amendment.” Id at 69.
46 Id at 31.
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While the Court generally requires probable cause for automobile
searches, Rakas demonstrated that with the right set of facts, police
do not always need probable cause to search a car. Put differently,
vehicle occupants may not be similarly situated under the Fourth
Amendment—even when they occupy the same vehicle. Some are
protected; some are not. Byrd would need to surmount one or more
of the obstacles described above to prove that he was the right type of
vehicle occupant entitled to invoke the Fourth Amendment.
I take a closer look at Byrd to examine what it means for Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Part I summarizes Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion and the brief concurrences submitted by Justices Thomas
and Alito. Part II scrutinizes Byrd ’s holding: I demonstrate that the
Court’s holding is not as simple as it seems, and I consider whether
the crucial elements of Justice Kennedy’s analysis affect the logic of
prior precedents and the Court’s view of standing under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III contemplates Byrd ’s impact on the develop-
ment of search and seizure law in the future.
I. The Court’s Reasoning in Byrd
In 1980, the Kentucky Supreme Court remarked that the law
on standing was “totally incomprehensible.”47 Though that state-
ment was hyperbole, the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings have
not always provided guidance and clarity regarding standing. For
example, prior to 1960, “[lower] courts were inclined to hold that
neither the bailee-operator of a vehicle nor a passenger therein had
standing with respect to a search of a vehicle.”48 Judges who denied
standing in such circumstances were not defying Supreme Court
precedent. In the Court’s first important automobile case, Carroll v
United States,49 the Justices reserved the question whether an occu-
pant of a vehicle “who did not own the automobile” could challenge a
police search.50 According to one account, the Court had addressed
“fourth amendment standing issues in only a dozen cases” between
47 Rawlings v Commonwealth, 581 SW2d 348, 349 (Ky 1979), aff ’d 448 US 98 (1980).
48 LaFave, 6 Search and Seizure, § 11.3(e) at 243 (footnote and citations omitted) (cited in
note 12).
49 267 US 132 (1925).
50 Id at 162.
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1948 and the announcement of Rakas.51 And since Rakas, the Court
had not heard a case involving standing to challenge a car search until
it decided to review Byrd.52
a. justice kennedy’s opinion for a unanimous court
OnSeptember 17, 2014, Terrence Byrd’s girlfriend, Latasha Reed,
rented a car for him, most likely because Byrd was ineligible to rent a
car due to his criminal record.53 After renting the car from a Budget
Rental Company facility in Wayne, New Jersey, Reed gave Byrd the
keys. Byrd was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agree-
ment. Byrd took control of the car and later headed to Pittsburgh,
after a stop at his home to gather some personal items which he put in
the trunk of the rental car. While driving on Interstate 81 near Har-
risburg, Byrd passed a state trooper who was parked in the median.
State Trooper David Long testified that he was suspicious of Byrd
“because he was driving with his hands at the ‘10 and 2’ position on
the steering wheel, sitting far back from the steering wheel, and driv-
ing a rental car.”54 The trooper knew the vehiclewas a rental car because
one of its windows contained a barcode. Based on these observations,
Long decided to follow Byrd. A short time later, he stopped Byrd for
remaining in the left lane too long after passing another vehicle.55
According to Long, Byrd was “‘visibly nervous’ and ‘was shaking and
51 Kuhns, 65 Iowa L Rev at 514 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 36).
52 A year after Rakas, a passenger in a taxi cab challenged a search of his suitcase which
police found in the trunk of the cab. See Arkansas v Sanders, 442 US 753 (1979). Because the
passenger “concede[d] that the suitcase was his property, . . . there [was] no question of his
standing to challenge the search.” Id at 761 n 8. Before Rakas, many of the Court’s auto-
mobile search rulings “assumed that a mere passenger in an automobile is entitled to pro-
tection against unreasonable searches occurring in his presence. In decisions upholding the
validity of automobiles searches, [the Court has] gone directly to the merits even though
some of the petitioners did not own or possess the vehicles in question.” Rakas, 439 US at
158–59 (White dissenting) (citations omitted).
53 Early in the oral argument, counsel for Byrd appeared to concede the point. Oral Ar-
gument in Byrd at 4 (cited in note 44) (“Justice Ginsburg: Could he have been—could he have
been the renter, given his criminal record? Mr. Loeb: Perhaps not, Your Honor.”).
54 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1524.
55 This was obviously a pretextual stop. Although not mentioned in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion, Byrd was African American. See e-mail from Joshua E. Rosenkranz, Counsel of
Record for Terrence Byrd, to Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law ( June 12, 2018) (on file with author). Trooper Long wanted to find a reason to question
Byrd and search the vehicle he was driving.
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had a hard time obtaining his driver’s license.’”56 After giving Long
an interim license and the rental agreement, Byrd told Long that a
friend had given permission to drive the car.
Another trooper, Travis Martin, soon arrived at the scene. Real-
izing that Byrd was not authorized to drive the vehicle, Martin
remarked that Byrd “has no expectation of privacy” in the car.57 After
Byrd refused consent to search the car, the troopers told Byrd they
did not need his consent because he was not listed on the rental
agreement.58 A search of the trunk revealed body armor and forty-
nine bricks of heroin in a laundry bag. The lower federal courts de-
nied Byrd’s suppression motion. Specifically, the district court, re-
lying on circuit precedent, ruled that an unauthorized driver of a
rental car lacked “standing” to challenge the search of the car.59
In the courts below, Byrd argued that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because he had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the rental car.60 Addressing that claim, Justice Kennedy began
his analysis by noting that “property concepts”61 would guide the
Court in evaluating Byrd’s argument. “One who owns and possesses
a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.”62 At the same time, the
Court’s precedents establish that a “common-law property interest in
the place searched” is not essential to claim “a reasonable expectation
of privacy in it.”63 Acknowledging that the Court had not offered “a
single metric or exhaustive list of considerations” to decide when a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,64 Justice Kennedy
56 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1524.
57 Id at 1525. A computer search of Byrd’s name revealed, inter alia, that Byrd “had prior
convictions for weapons and drug charges as well as an outstanding warrant in New Jersey for
a probation violation.” Id. The troopers learned that the State of New Jersey did not want
Byrd arrested for extradition. Id.
58 Id. During the back-and-forth with the troopers, Byrd admitted that he had a “blunt” in
the car, which the troopers understood to mean a marijuana cigarette. Id.
59 Byrd, 2015 WL 5038455 ∗2.
60 At the Court, Byrd proffered an alternative claim that he “had a common-law property
interest in the rental car as a second bailee that would have provided him with a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle.” Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1526–27. The Court refused to
consider this claim because it had not been raised or considered below. Id.
61 Id at 1527.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527.
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reaffirmed Rakas’s instruction that privacy interests “must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to con-
cepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”65 Positive law and societal un-
derstandings, according to Kennedy, “are often linked” and that
linkage was evident in this case because “[o]ne of the main rights
attaching to property is the right to exclude others,” and society rec-
ognizes that “one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of
the right to exclude.”66
Offering a vastly different perspective and at the same time swing-
ing for a doctrinal home run, the Solicitor General proposed a bright-
line rule that would limit Fourth Amendment privacy to those persons
listed on the rental contract. The government argued that only au-
thorized drivers of rental cars have expectations of privacy in those
vehicles and “drivers who are not listed on rental agreements always
lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental
company’s lack of authorization alone.”67 The government’s argu-
ment was apparently based, in part, on the view that Rakas precluded
passengers from challenging the search of a car’s interior. The Court,
however, rejected this stance because it “rests on too restrictive a view
of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”68 Though the government
believed that Rakas supported its position, Justice Kennedy explained
the government had misread Rakas because it “did not hold that pas-
sengers cannot have an expectation of privacy in automobiles.”69 In
fact, as Justice Kennedy reminded the government, Rakas specifically
rejected the dissent’s claim that it was “hold[ing]” that “a passenger
lawfully in an automobile ‘may not invoke the exclusionary rule and
65 Id at 1527, citing Rakas, 439 US at 144 n 12.
66 Byrd at 1527, quoting Rakas, 439 US at 144 n 12, citing William Blackstone, 2 Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, ch 1 (1765).
67 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527. The government’s proposed bright-line rule was at odds with the
laws of several states. “For example, under state law in Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada, New
York, Oregon, and Wisconsin, spouses automatically are authorized drivers regardless of
whether they are listed on the rental car contract.” Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Byrd v United States, Docket No 16-1371, ∗13 (US filed Nov 20, 2017)
(“ACLU Brief ”). Thus, the government’s proffered test was not as workable as it seemed on
paper.
68 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527–28.
69 Id at 1528.
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challenge a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a
possessory interest in it.’”70 Narrower in scope,Rakasmerely held that
legitimate presence alone was insufficient to assert a Fourth Amend-
ment interest, which was enough to resolve the case.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy explained thatRakas did not control
Byrd’s case “because this case does not involve a passenger at all but
instead the driver and sole occupant of a rental car.”71 Embracing
Justice Powell’s view in his Rakas concurrence, Justice Kennedy
agreed that a “distinction . . . may be made in some circumstances
between the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers and the rights of
an individual who has exclusive control of an automobile or of its
locked compartments.”72 This distinction among occupants of auto-
mobiles paralleled some of the logic of Jones v United States,73 where
Jones was arrested after police found narcotics in the apartment in
which he was temporarily residing. The apartment “belonged to a
friend” who had given Jones permission to use the apartment along
with a key to it.74 Jones had some clothes in the apartment, had slept
there “maybe a night,” but the apartment was not his home.75 Though
the apartment was not Jones’s home, the Court ruled that Jones had
standing to challenge the search.76
For Justice Kennedy, Byrd’s Fourth Amendment claim was similar
to Jones’s because both “had complete dominion and control over the
[place searched] and could exclude others from it.”77 This under-
standing of what the Fourth Amendment protects was “also consis-
tent”78 with the Rakas majority’s explanation that “one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [the] right to exclude.”79
Relying on these passages from Jones andRakas, Justice Kennedy then
stated: “TheCourt sees no reason why the expectation of privacy that
70 Rakas, 439 US at 149 n 17 (citations omitted).
71 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528.
72 Id.
73 362 US 257 (1960).
74 Id at 259.
75 Id.
76 Id at 265.
77 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528, citing Rakas, 439 US at 149.
78 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528.
79 Id, citing Rakas, 439 US at 144 n 12.
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comes from lawful possession and control and the attendant right to
exclude would differ depending on whether the car in question is
rented or privately owned by someone other than the person in
current possession of it.”80 Put simply, both Byrd and Jones “had the
expectation of privacy that comes with the right to exclude.”81 Per-
haps offering a slight dig at the government, Kennedy noted that the
government conceded that “an unauthorized driver in sole possession
of a rental car would be permitted to exclude third parties from it,
such as a carjacker.”82
Of course, Byrd’s situation differed from Jones’s in at least one
significant way: Jones had the permission of his friend to use the
apartment, whereas Byrd was expressly barred from driving the ve-
hicle under the rental agreement and his girlfriend had no authority
under the agreement to override that restriction. Thus, the govern-
ment insisted that because Byrd’s driving constituted a breach of the
rental agreement, he had no standing to complain about the search.83
In any event, the Court was not persuaded. First, the Court found the
government was “misreading” the rental agreement when it argued
that the rental company would consider the agreement “void” once
an unauthorized driver operated the car.84
Second, Justice Kennedy noted that car rental agreements contain
many restrictions, including, for example, prohibitions on driving a
rental car on unpaved roads or driving while using a handheld cell-
phone.85 Even the government acknowledged that such restrictions
have no connection with a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy
in the rental car.86 To be sure, the Court observed that violating the
authorized-driver provision is a serious breach of the rental agree-
ment, “but the Government fail[ed] to explain what bearing this
breach of contract, standing alone, has on expectations of privacy in
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1529, citing Oral Argument in Byrd at 48–49 (cited in note 44).
83 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1529.
84 Id. For good measure, Justice Kennedy quoted the rental agreement, which stated: “Per-
mitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle is a violation of the rental agreement.
This may result in any and all coverage otherwise provided by the rental agreement being void
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the car.”87 Put differently, Kennedy saw no principled distinction “be-
tween the authorized-driver provision and the other provisions the
Government agrees do not eliminate an expectation of privacy.”88 Such
provisions concern “risk allocation between private parties—violators
might pay additional fees, lose insurance coverage, or assume liability
for damage resulting from the breach.”89 However, these concerns
about risk allocation are irrelevant to the issue of whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car if he “has lawful
possession of and control over the car.”90 In other words, the rental
agreement’s failure to recognize Byrd as an authorized driver did not
eliminate the protection the Fourth Amendment provided by his
“lawful possession and control and the attendant right to exclude”91
others from the vehicle.92
After explaining why the provisions of the rental agreement did not
undermine constitutional protections, Justice Kennedy explained that
the Court must focus on “the concept of lawful possession.”93 At this
point, Kennedy considered “an important qualification”94 of Byrd’s
proposed rule, which he had earlier described as urging that “the sole
occupant of a rental car always has an expectation of privacy in it
based on mere possession and control.”95 Recalling that prior cases
had established that “wrongful” presence at the scene of a search
would preclude a person from invoking Fourth Amendment pro-
tection, Kennedy observed that “[n]o matter the degree of possession
and control, the car thief would not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a stolen car.”96 He then mentioned an argument that the




91 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528.
92 See also Orin Kerr, Byrd v. United States: The Supreme Court Takes a Broad View of Fourth
Amendment Standing (Volokh Conspiracy, May 15, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/VEK9
-RS6W (explaining that Byrd adopted the norm that “the terms in rental car contracts are
really about the risk allocation under the contract, not the rental car company’s efforts to
block the delegation of possession to someone else. Given that, the fact of not having the
person’s name on the rental car contract doesn’t eliminate the otherwise-existing Fourth
Amendment right.”).
93 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1529.
94 Id.
95 Id at 1528.
96 Id at 1529.
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government did not make below, namely, that Byrd’s possession of
the car was “wrongful” because he intentionally used his girlfriend to
mislead the rental car company.97 In the government’s eyes, Byrd’s
actions made him the equivalent of a car thief.98 Observing that it
was unclear whether the conduct of which the government accused
Byrd amounted to a crime, the Court remanded this claim to the
lower court, while intimating that the government should eventually
prevail: “[I]t may be,” the Court said, “that there is no reason that the
law should distinguish between one who obtains a vehicle through
subterfuge of the type theGovernment alleges occurred here and one
who steals the car outright.”99 In other words, if the government’s
view of the facts were true, then Byrd might be “no better situated
than a car thief,”100 and thus lack an expectation of privacy in the
rental car.
b. justices thomas’s and alito’s concurring opinions
While joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Justices Thomas and
Alito penned brief concurring opinions. Justice Thomas chided the
parties for failing to “adequately address several threshold questions”
related to Byrd’s claim that he held a property interest in the rental
car.101 According to Justice Thomas, Byrd’s argument that the vehicle
“was his effect”102 required consideration of at least three issues. First,
97 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1530.
98 Briefly put, the government argued that Byrd knew he would never be able to rent a car
due to his criminal record. Therefore, “he used Reed, who had no intention of using the car
for her own purposes, to procure the car for him to transport heroin to Pittsburgh.” Id.
99 Id. Interestingly, the Court instructed the lower courts on remand to address the
government’s “theft-equivalent” claim despite the government’s failure to raise this claim in
the proceedings below. By contrast, the Court was silent on whether the lower courts should
consider Byrd’s alternative claim that he possessed a property interest in the car as a second
bailee, which was also not raised below. Id at 1524 (concluding that a “remand is necessary to
address in the first instance the Government’s argument that . . . Byrd had no greater ex-
pectation privacy than a car thief”).
Also, the government had argued in its brief in opposition to certiorari that even if
Byrd had standing to challenge the search, the troopers had probable cause that the ve-
hicle contained evidence of criminality. The Court of Appeals did not address that issue in
light of its ruling that Byrd lacked standing. The Court noted that on remand, the appellate
court was free to decide the probable-cause issue if the argument had been preserved by the
government. Id at 1530.
100 Id at 1531.
101 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1531 (Thomas, J, concurring).
102 Id.
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“under the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” what type
of property interest was necessary to prove that an item was some-
one’s personal “effect”?103 Second, “what body of law determines
whether that property interest is present—modern state law, the com-
mon law of 1791, or something else?”104 Finally, is operating a rental car
as an unauthorized driver “illegal or otherwise wrongful under the
relevant law,” and, if so, does that unlawful conduct impact the Fourth
Amendment analysis?105 In Justice Thomas’s view, the answers to these
questions are “vitally important to assessing whether Byrd can claim
that the rental car is his effect.”106
Justice Alito had a more nuanced view of the Court’s holding. He
asserted that the Court had not held that the typical unauthorized
driver of a rental car can always assert the illegality of a search.
Rather, the Court held that “an unauthorized driver of a rental car is
not always barred from contesting a search of the vehicle.”107 Justice
Alito explained that an unauthorized driver’s right to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim turned on the answers to several questions, in-
cluding “the terms of the particular rental agreement,” “the circum-
stances surrounding the rental,” “the reason why the driver took the
wheel,” “any property right that the driver might have,” and “the
legality of his conduct under the law of the State where the conduct
occurred.”108 Put differently, in future cases a defendant would have
to domore than simply allege that he was an unauthorized driver who
had not committed a fraud on the rental company in order to merit
standing. Based “[o]n this understanding,” Justice Alito joined Jus-
tice Kennedy’s majority opinion.109 But Justice Alito was joining an
opinion that did not exist. Factors that Justice Alito considered rel-
evant to whether an unauthorized driver had standing to challenge a
search, for example, “the terms of the particular rental agreement,”110
and “the reason why the driver took the wheel,”111 were irrelevant to
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1531 (Thomas, J, concurring).
106 Id.
107 Id at 1531 (Alito, J, concurring).
108 Id at 1532.
109 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1532.
110 Id.
111 Id at 1531 (Alito, J, concurring).
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or played no role in Justice Kennedy’s analysis. Justice Alito made
a point of saying that on remand, the Court of Appeals could reex-
amine whether Byrd had standing to challenge the search or resolve
the appeal on other grounds.112
II. Fourth Amendment Protection for Unauthorized Drivers
of Rental Cars? Not as Easy as It Seems
The result in Byrd—especially from a unanimous Court—was
a surprise. And at this point, the Court’s motivation is not clear. In
the GPS-tracking case, United States v Jones,113 which held that the
government conducted a search when it surreptitiously placed a
global positioning system (GPS) device on a vehicle,114 court watch-
ers honed in on the Deputy Solicitor General’s concession during
oral argument that the government’s position would allow FBI agents
to place GPS tracking devices on the cars of the Justices without
cause.115 The result in Riley v California,116 which ruled that police
could not routinely search an arrestee’s cell phone incident to arrest,
was driven by the technological advances that allow cell phones to
store vast amounts of personal information.117 There was no similar
revelation or magic moment in Byrd that appeared to make a dif-
ference.118 I believe that most, if not all, of the Justices would not
112 Id.
113 565 US 400 (2012).
114 Id at 404.
115 See, for example, Linda Greenhouse, Reasonable Expectations (NY Times, Nov 16, 2011),
online at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/reasonable-expectations (Perma
archive unavailable) (“[I]t’s not implausible to suppose that the outcome of the GPS case will
depend in large part on the justices’ view of reasonable government behavior toward a cit-
izenry that includes themselves. In fact, it’s implausible to suppose otherwise.”). See also
Garrett Epps, Justice Roberts: Could the Government Track My Car? (Atlantic, Nov 8, 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/9VFP-GNYC; Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites, 14 NC J L &
Tech 461, 461–63 (2013) (arguing that the Justices in Jones could only sympathize with Jones
once they realized that the government could target them as well).
116 134 S Ct 2473 (2014).
117 Id at 2493 (“But the fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up a
photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital
gallery. The fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not
justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years.”).
118 One commentator on Byrd thinks that the Justices were concerned about the Fourth
Amendment rights of innocent drivers:
[T]he Justices were worried about the interests of the innocent, when confronting
the Government’s argument for their proposed rule in the case. The Justices were
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allow an unauthorized driver to operate a car he or she had rented,
nor would they drive a rental car without being listed on the rental
agreement. Maybe the best explanation for the result in Byrd is that
the government overreached in offering a rule that would confine
Fourth Amendment privacy only to persons listed on the rental agree-
ment. This was asking too much even for a Court ordinarily unre-
ceptive to Fourth Amendment claims,119 so the Justices voted for
Byrd by default.
a. the uncertain basis of the court’s holding
While the result in Byrd was a surprise, the basis and scope of its
holding is uncertain. The Court held: “[A]s a general rule, someone
in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does
not list him or her as an authorized driver.”120 In a key passage, Justice
Kennedy stated that “lawful possession and control and the attendant
right to exclude”121 affords standing to challenge a search. Despite this
worried that if the Government got its way, and got them to rule that unauthorized
drivers had no privacy rights in the trunks of cars, that rental cars would then always
be subjected to being stopped, until it is determined that the driver is authorized, or
that unauthorized drivers, who are not committing any crime (only a contract vio-
lation) will be subject to having the police rummaging around their belongings on
the side of the road, and there will be no need to offer any justification. Police would
be authorized to rummage around on a whim.
Don Murray, Byrd v. United States—Fourth Amendment Applies to Unauthorized, Non-Thief
Rental Car Drivers (Shalley and Murray, May 16, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/R9U6
-UC7V. Before any motorist can be stopped, police must have probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that the driver has committed a traffic offense or other crime. Thus, in one sense,
any motorist lawfully seized is not entirely “innocent.” Even assuming, however, that
motorists who commit traffic offenses are “innocent,” if the Justices were truly worried about
the Fourth Amendment rights of “innocent” drivers, they would have reversed Whren v
United States, 517 US 806 (1996), which ruled that pretextual traffic stops do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Pretextual traffic stops do more harm to the Fourth Amendment rights
of “innocent” motorists than police stops of rental vehicles operated by unauthorized drivers.
See Tracey Maclin and Maria Savarese, Martin Luther King Jr. and Pretextual Stops (and
Arrests): Reflections on How Far We Have Not Come Fifty Years Later, 49 Memphis L Rev 43
(2018).
119 Compare Greenhouse, Reasonable Expectations (acknowledging that a few Fourth Amend-
ment rulings for defendants, like the GPS case, are exceptions; however, “Fourth Amendment
cases involving behavior with which the justices don’t instinctively identify, and in which the
court rules reflexively for the government, are too numerous” to be considered anything but the
norm for the Court) (cited in note 115).
120 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1524.
121 Id at 1528.
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seemingly straightforward language, Byrd’s holding leaves several ques-
tions unanswered.
For starters, why was Byrd’s operation of the vehicle “lawful”?
“Lawful” is not the first adjective that comes to mind if asked to
describe Byrd’s possession of the rental car. Putting aside his calcu-
lated efforts to mislead the rental company and also assuming that his
actions did not constitute a criminal offense in most states, it is not
obvious why Byrd had “lawful” possession and control of the car.
While Byrd may have had his girlfriend’s permission to drive the car,
certainly, the owner of the car, Budget Rental Company, prohibited
Byrd from driving the car by the rental agreement terms.122
The uncertain meaning of “lawful” in this context was illustrated
during the oral argument. Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked the gov-
ernment’s lawyer whether the son of a father who owns the car, but is
not an authorized driver on the insurance contract or the car regis-
tration, has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car after the
father gives the son permission to drive the car.123 The lawyer replied
that the son possesses a privacy interest because he “has a connection
to the owner of the car.”124 But what is the difference between this
hypothetical and the facts in Byrd? Byrd also had a “connection” to
the renter of the car. Imagine that the father in Justice Sotomayor’s
hypothetical allows his daughter to drive the car, but explicitly tells
the daughter and her boyfriend that the boyfriend is forbidden to
drive the vehicle. If the daughter allows the boyfriend to drive the car,
is he a “lawful” driver? After all, the boyfriend has a “connection” to
an authorized driver. But having a “connection” to an authorized
driver does not provide much guidance to police who are deciding
whether they can conduct a search, or to judges who have to decide
122 Compare Goldman, 89 BU L Rev at 1720 (cited in note 19):
[T]he unauthorized driver is a willing participant in the misconduct. The un-
authorized driver is driving a rental car while well aware that she does not have
the owner rental company’s permission; she thus knows that she is in wrongful
possession of the car. As [United States v Wellons, 32 F3d 117 (4th Cir 1994)]
noted, the unauthorized driver is in the exact same position as if she had stolen
the car from the rental company’s premises. Neither person is in lawful pos-
session of the car.
(footnotes omitted).
123 Oral Argument in Byrd at 65 (cited in note 44).
124 Id.
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whether a person has standing to challenge the search. Unfortu-
nately, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not explain why Byrd’s pos-
session of the vehicle was “lawful.”
Perhaps what made Byrd’s possession and control “lawful” was the
fact he had permission to drive the car from the authorized user, his
girlfriend. Orin Kerr thinks that Byrd announced a limited holding.
“Delegated rights from the legitimate renter ordinarily control, and
at least the kinds of rental car contract terms that currently exist don’t
change that.”125 That fact—permission from the authorized driver—
was emphasized in Byrd’s brief and had been the overriding factor in
the Eighth and Ninth Circuit rulings that granted standing to un-
authorized drivers. Likewise, Professor Sherry Colb writes, “the im-
portant thing is that Byrd had permission to drive the car from the
woman who rented it, and that gave him standing.”126 Colb argues
that Byrd “recognizes that privacy arises not only from property own-
ership but from relationships between people who share spaces with
one another.”127
The problem with these explanations, however, is that in the
analysis section of his opinion, Justice Kennedy never mentions that
Byrd had his girlfriend’s permission to drive the car. If permission
from the legitimate renter was essential to proving a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in these circumstances, one would expect the
Court to highlight that fact. Perhaps Justice Kennedy did not rely
upon this factor because it is too similar to the concept of “legiti-
mately on [the] premises” that was deemed insufficient in Rakas.128
125 Kerr, The Supreme Court Takes a Broad View (cited in note 92).
126 Sherry F. Colb, Rental Cars, Privacy, and Suppression of Evidence (Verdict, June 20, 2018),
archived at http://perma.cc/5ZXB-SZW6.
127 Id.
128 Rakas, 439 US at 143–48. Al Alschuler makes a compelling argument why an owner’s
permission should be sufficient to show a reasonable expectation of privacy:
In Rakas, the driver of the automobile, who apparently also was its owner, almost
certainly had given her passengers permission to use the glove compartment and the
area under the seat. In all but the rarest circumstances, a person who stores property
in an automobile’s locked glove compartment with the automobile owner’s per-
mission has a reasonable expectation that the property will remain private in that
compartment. Cultural expectations of privacy are changing and uncertain, but not
so uncertain as to make a denial of that proposition anything but silly. Nevertheless,
it is the owner’s permission and not anyone’s presence or absence that gives rise to
the legitimate expectation of privacy.
Alschuler, 4 NIU L Rev at 12 (cited in note 31).
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And, there is nomention anywhere inByrd about privacy arising from
relationships between people who share spaces with each other.129
Moreover, if permission from the legitimate renter or owner is enough
to confer standing, then the unlicensed driver would also have standing
to challenge a search.130 There is no suggestion, however, that Justice
Kennedy meant his holding to go that far.
b. do property rights or societal norms matter most?
1. “The right to exclude.” Rather than emphasize the fact that Byrd
had permission from the authorized driver, Justice Kennedy stressed
that Byrd had the right to exclude third parties, like a carjacker, from
the vehicle. Kennedy suggests that this right is a property interest.
Focusing on property interests may be the key to deciphering Byrd,
because five weeks later, Justice Kennedy asserted that property in-
terests are “fundamental” and “dispositive” in deciding whether a
person has a legitimate expectation of privacy against a challenged
police intrusion.131 Assuming a right to exclude others is a property
Alschuler further notes that the Rakas Court “did not discuss the possible significance of
the defendants’ failure to establish the owner’s permission” as a basis for invoking the Fourth
Amendment. Id at 14. Any uncertainty about whether an owner’s permission could confer
standingwas eliminated byRawlings v Kentucky, 448US 98, 104–5 (1980), where theCourtmade
clear that a defendant does not prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy merely
because he had the owner’s permission to store his effects in her purse.
129 During the oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked counsel for Byrd: “Does the familial
relationship really matter?” Counsel replied: “No, Your Honor. It simply bolsters the ex-
pectation.” Oral Argument in Byrd at 32 (cited in note 44).
130 See People v McCoy, 646 NE2d 1361, 1365 (Ill App 1995) (Cook, J, specially concurring):
The fact the relative is not licensed to drive might be relevant on the issue [of ]
whether the lessee actually loaned out the vehicle, but it is not relevant on the
relative’s possessory interest. It is possible for an unlicensed driver to possess a
motor vehicle, just as it is possible for an unlicensed driver to own a motor vehicle.
Even where a vehicle is operated illegally the operator may have a possessory interest
in the vehicle.
Compare People v LeFlore, 996 NE2d 678, 689 (Ill App 2013) (dicta noting the court’s dis-
agreement with the dissent’s conclusion that a “defendant’s status as an unlicensed driver does
not necessarily defeat his expectation of privacy in [his girlfriend’s] vehicle”), with id at
706 (Birkett concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “[a]s a revoked driver,
defendant clearly had no legitimate expectation of privacy in [his girlfriend’s] vehicle or its
movements”).
131 Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2228 (2018) (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (noting the
“commonsense principle that the absence of property law analogues can be dispositive of
privacy expectations”).
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interest,132 perhaps the best way to read Byrd is that the existence or
possession of that right is crucial to establishing an expectation of
privacy.
Is the right to exclude imperative to establish Fourth Amendment
standing? The answer has been a moving target for over half a cen-
tury. The Justices have sent conflicting signals on the question.Many
years ago, Justice Robert Jackson commented on why a “right to
exclude” should not be determinative of one’s standing to challenge a
police search inMcDonald v United States.133 There, police suspected
McDonald of running an illegal numbers operation in a room he
rented in a rooming house. Without a warrant, an officer opened a
window of the landlady’s apartment and climbed through. The of-
ficer identified himself to the landlady and then admitted his col-
leagues.134 After searching rooms on the first floor, the police went to
the second floor of the rooming house where McDonald’s room was
located. An officer stood on a chair and peered through the transom.
Inside he saw McDonald and Washington with gambling parapher-
nalia. The officer ordered McDonald to open the door. McDonald
and Washington were arrested and the evidence seized. The gov-
ernment contended that McDonald had no standing to complain
about the intrusion into the landlady’s premises and the arrest of the
defendants was based on evidence seen in plain view from a location
where the police were lawfully present.135
Although the Court ruled that the warrantless entry, search, and
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not directly
address the government’s argument that McDonald lacked standing
to challenge the entry into the landlady’s home.136 Justice Jackson,
132 I agree with Orin Kerr that the Court did not articulate why a “right to exclude” is a
property interest. “The Court doesn’t grapple with what doctrines or approaches to property
law should govern [in this setting]. . . . [I]t’s not entirely clear why [an unauthorized driver’s
right to exclude a carjacker is a property interest] or what kind of property law test the Court
has in mind to understand the right to exclude.” Kerr, The Supreme Court Takes a Broad View
(cited in note 92).
133 335 US 451 (1948).
134 According to Justice Jackson, the officer was in plain clothes, “showed his badge to the
frightened woman and then brushed her aside and then unlocked doors and admitted two
other officers.” Id at 457–58 ( Jackson, J, concurring).
135 Id at 453–54.
136 The Court simply stated: “We do not stop to examine that syllogism for flaws. As-
suming its correctness, we reject the result.” Id at 454. On a different aspect of McDonald,
Professor Kuhns states that McDonald was “the first case to present a fourth amendment
standing issue.” Kuhns, 65 Iowa L Rev at 526 (cited in note 36). While not employing the
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however, believed that McDonald had standing to challenge the
police intrusion into the rooming house. “But it seems to me that
each tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the
common hallways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and
constitutionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the
entire building against unlawful breaking and entry.”137
Since Justice Jackson proffered this view, the Court has gone back-
and-forth on the importance of a right to exclude for standing pur-
poses.Twenty years after Jackson’s observation, inMancusi vDeForte,138
the Court held that a vice president of a local Teamsters Union had
standing to challenge a search of an office he shared with other union
officials.139 The Court brushed aside the claim that DeForte lacked
standing because he had no right to exclude others from the office. “It
is, of course, irrelevant, that the Union or some of its officials might
have validly consented to a search of the area where the records were
kept, regardless of DeForte’s wishes.”140 The Court explained that
“capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion.”141
Similarly, in Minnesota v Olson,142 police entered the home of Rob-
ert Olson’s girlfriend during the afternoon without a warrant to
arrest him for murder.143 Olson had spent the previous night at the
residence and some of his clothes were there. After the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that Olson had a sufficient interest in the
girlfriend’s home to contest the police entry, the Court affirmed,
holding that a person’s “status as an overnight guest is alone enough
term “standing,” McDonald “upheld the right of one defendant [Washington] to exclude il-
legally obtained evidence solely on the ground that his codefendant [McDonald] was entitled
to exclude the evidence.” Id (footnote omitted). Eventually, this aspect of McDonald was
overruled by Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 171 (1969) (rejecting the argument that
“if evidence is inadmissible against one defendant or conspirator, because tainted by elec-
tronic surveillance illegal as to him, it is also inadmissible against his codefendant or co-
conspirator”); id at 172 (stating that “[c]oconspirators and codefendants have been accorded
no special standing”).
137 McDonald, 335 US at 458 ( Jackson, J, concurring).
138 392 US 364 (1968).
139 Id at 369.
140 Id at 369–70.
141 Id at 368.
142 495 US 91 (1990).
143 Id at 93.
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to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”144 In doing so, the Court
rejected the State’s argument that Olson’s claim of a protected in-
terest in the premises turned on whether he “had complete dominion
and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.”145
TheCourt noted that the fact that the host “has ultimate control of the
house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation
of privacy.”146 Reserving constitutional protection only to those with
the authority to exclude others was inconsistent with societal norms.
“If the untrammeled power to admit and exclude were essential to
Fourth Amendment protection, an adult daughter temporarily living
in the home of her parents would have no legitimate expectation of
privacy because her right to admit or exclude would be subject to her
parents’ veto.”147
On the other hand, statements from the Court in other cases ap-
pear to condition Fourth Amendment protection on a right to ex-
clude third parties. In a baffling footnote that both emphasized and
discounted the importance of property interests to Fourth Amend-
ment protection, Justice Rehnquist stated in Rakas, “One of the main
rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, . . . and
one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in
all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of
this right to exclude.”148 And in another part of Rakas, Rehnquist
distinguished car passengers from someone who is allowed to stay
in a friend’s apartment while the friend is away temporarily or a
person using a telephone booth. The person staying at a friend’s
apartment “ha[s] complete dominion and control over the apartment
and could exclude others from it” and the person using the phone
booth is able “to exclude all others.”149 Tellingly, Rehnquist over-
144 Id at 96–97.
145 Id at 98.
146 Olson, 495 US at 99.
147 Id at 99–100. See also Bumper v North Carolina, 391 US 543, 548 n 11 (1968) (stating
that there was “no question of [Bumper’s] standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search”
of his grandmother’s home “because the house searched was his home”).
148 Rakas, 439 US at 143 n 12 (citations omitted).
149 Id at 149, citing Jones v United States, 362 US 257 (1960), and Katz v United States,
389 US 347 (1967). Katz held that government eavesdropping on the conversations of
someone who uses a public telephone constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. “[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
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looked whether a passenger in a car could exclude third parties from
the vehicle.150
One year after Rakas, in Rawlings v Kentucky,151 the Court was
more adamant about the necessity of having a right to exclude in
order to claim Fourth Amendment protection.152 In that case, po-
lice lawfully entered a home to arrest the homeowner. Although
the homeowner was absent, police discovered several persons and
“smelled marihuana smoke and sawmarihuana seeds” in the home.153
Three persons, including David Rawlings and Vanessa Cox, were
detained to await the arrival of a search warrant. When other officers
returned with the warrant, an officer ordered Cox to empty the
contents of her purse. The purse contained a large quantity of illegal
drugs, which Rawlings claimed were his. The Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that Rawlings had no standing to contest the search
of the purse.154 As he did in Rakas, Justice Rehnquist authored the
Court’s opinion. In rejecting Rawlings’s argument that he had a
privacy interest in the purse because Cox had given him permis-
sion to store his drugs in the purse,155 Rehnquist outlined several
factors that undercut Rawlings’s claim.156 One factor was that Rawl-
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.” Id at 352.
150 In fact, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Rakas never bothers explaining “why the pas-
sengers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their friend’s car, other than on
[his] say so. After all, they seemed to do as much, if not more, to maintain privacy in their
friend’s car as Mr. Katz did in the public phone booth.” Nadia B. Soree, The Demise of Fourth
Amendment Standing: From Standing Room to Center Orchestra, 8 Nev L Rev 570, 601 (2008).
151 448 US 98 (1980).
152 Id at 105.
153 Id at 100.
154 Rawlings v Commonwealth, 581 SW2d 348, 349 (Ky 1979).
155 A majority of the Justices expressed skepticism that Cox consented to the transfer of the
drugs. Rawlings, 448 US at 105.
156 The Court deemed important the following: (1) When Rawlings placed the drugs in
Cox’s purse, “he had known her for only a few days.” (2) Rawlings “had never sought or
received [prior] access to her purse.” (3) Rawlings did not “have any right to exclude other
persons from access to Cox’s purse.” (4) The “precipitous nature of the transaction” did not
support the inference that Rawlings took “normal precautions to maintain his privacy.”
(5) Rawlings’s admission that “he had no subjective expectation that Cox’s purse would re-
main free from governmental intrusion.” Id. Professor Wayne LaFave has cogently explained
why none these factors “can withstand close scrutiny” and are irrelevant to the issue decided
in Rawlings. LaFave, 6 Search and Seizure, § 11.3(c) at 218–22 (cited in note 12).
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ings lacked “any right to exclude other persons from access to Cox’s
purse.”157
Obviously, the Court has not resolved whether a right to exclude
others is essential to establish an expectation of privacy. The Court
has read Jones and Katz to mean “that a right to exclude is one way to
gain an expectation of privacy.”158 Other cases, such as DeForte and
Olson, establish that an absence of a right to exclude has no bearing on
the issue. Finally, Rakas and Rawlings intimate that “without a right to
exclude there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy.”159 Justice
Kennedy, the author of Byrd, has noted elsewhere that where societal
expectations of privacy exist, “the absence of any property right to
exclude others” is irrelevant.160 Unfortunately, Byrd makes no effort
to clarify the issue or reconcile the tension among these cases.
If the “right to exclude others” is the basis for Byrd ’s holding, then
Byrd means that even when an owner who is not present provides
consent to search, that consent is ineffective to override an unau-
thorized driver’s refusal to allow a police search. During oral argu-
ment, several Justices asked questions that involved purported con-
sent by the owner of the vehicle which appeared to supersede Byrd’s
privacy in the vehicle. For example, Chief Justice Roberts asked
about a rental contract that contained a provision that required the
driver to consent to a search if stopped by the police.161 Justice Alito
wanted to know whether Byrd could contest a police search “if the
rental agreement said that if any unauthorized person uses the car,
157 Rawlings, 448 US at 105, citing Rakas, 439 US at 149. Of course, unlike Byrd and the
defendants in Rakas, Rawlings claimed ownership of the drugs, and thus had a property in-
terest in the items seized. That fact made no difference to the Rawlings Court because “Rakas
emphatically rejected the notion that ‘arcane’ concepts of property law ought to control the
ability to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” Rawlings, 448 US at 105, quoting
Rakas, 439 US at 149–50 n 17. The Court’s duplicity is obvious:
Rakas had emphasized the defendants’ failure to allege ownership of the
property seized, and it had said that an owner of property would “in all like-
lihood” have standing to challenge its search or seizure “by virtue of [his] right to
exclude.” Accordingly, the defendant in Rawlings said to the Supreme Court, “I am
the owner.” And the Court responded, “Mr. Rawlings, don’t be arcane.”
Alschuler, 4 NIU L Rev at 15 (cited in note 31).
158 LaFave, 6 Search and Seizure, § 11.3(a) at 181 n 79 (cited in note 12).
159 Id.
160 Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 101 (1998) (Kennedy, J, concurring).
161 Oral Argument in Byrd at 4–5 (cited in note 44).
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[the company] consent[s] to a search by the police?”162 Finally, Justice
Kennedy wanted an answer to the question of whether, if police
phoned the car rental company and received permission to search the
car, that search violated Byrd’s Fourth Amendment right.163 If a right
to exclude is the driving force behind the result in Byrd, then the
unauthorized driver defendant should prevail in each hypothetical
because he has “lawful possession and control [of the vehicle] and the
attendant right to exclude,”164 and thus would have an expectation of
privacy to challenge any search. And even if the rental company has a
superior property interest over an unauthorized driver vis-à-vis the
vehicle, as in Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical, the company’s property
interest does not eliminate the unauthorized driver’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that comes with lawful possession and control.
Curiously, counsel for Byrd told the Justices that “the owner can—
can grant [police] consent—to search the—the car.”165 That answer,
however, is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents.166
2. A change in Fourth Amendment doctrine?Assuming that the right
to exclude is essential to the result in Byrd, does this logic signify a
change in Fourth Amendment doctrine? Consider the defendants in
Rakas who were passengers in a vehicle. They too likely possessed a
right to exclude third parties. Imagine that the driver of the vehicle in
Rakas stopped at a convenience store to purchase a cup of coffee,
leaving the defendants, Rakas and King, inside the car to await her
162 Id at 9.
163 Id at 10.
164 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528.
165 Oral Argument in Byrd at 10 (cited in note 44).
166 Counsel’s answer is inconsistent with Chapman v United States, 365 US 617 (1960),
which held that a landlord did not have the authority to consent to a search of his tenant’s
home, and Stoner v California, 376 US 483 (1964), which held that a hotel clerk cannot
consent to a search of the room of a hotel guest. Admittedly, Byrd seems distinguishable from
Chapman and Stoner because Byrd was not authorized by the rental company to drive the
rental car, whereas Chapman and Stoner were authorized respectively by the landlord and
hotel to be on the premises. But that distinction brings us back to the relevance of Byrd’s
status as an unauthorized driver, which Justice Kennedy’s opinion finds not to be particularly
significant. See notes 83–92 and accompanying text. Finally, if the police called the rental
company and got consent, as in Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical, the conflict between the
company’s consent and Byrd’s refusal to consent should be resolved in favor of Byrd. Georgia
v Randolph, 547 US 103 (2006), ruled that where a wife gives police consent to search her
home, but the husband is present and objects, the objection of the physically present husband
prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable as to the husband.
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return.167 With the driver inside the store, certainly Rakas and King,
like Byrd, “would be permitted to exclude third parties from [the
vehicle], such as a carjacker.”168 Yet, Rakas ruled that passengers
lacked privacy interests in the glove compartment and area under-
neath the front seat, just as passengers lack privacy in the vehicle’s
trunk. To be sure, as Justice Kennedy reminded us, Byrd did “not
involve a passenger at all but instead the driver and sole occupant of
a rental car.”169 But that difference has no bearing on the right to
exclude. If Byrd had been a passenger while his girlfriend drove the
rental car to Pittsburgh, he would have still possessed a right to ex-
clude third parties from the vehicle during a rest stop while his girl-
friend was inside a restaurant buying a cup of coffee.
Similarly, consider whether a right to exclude would affect the re-
sult in Minnesota v Carter.170 There, two men, Wayne Thomas Car-
ter andMelvin Johns, came to Kimberly Thompson’s home. Relying
on a tip from a confidential informant, an officer went to a window
of Thompson’s ground-floor apartment and was able to observe
through a gap in the closed blind Carter and John packaging cocaine.
This observation led to a search warrant and the subsequent arrest of
the defendants and the seizure of incriminating evidence. Police later
determined that Carter and Johns lived in Chicago and came to the
apartment “for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine.”171 The
men had never been to the residence before and were there for less
than three hours. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the de-
fendants had standing to challenge the officer’s observation because
they had a legitimate expectation of privacy as guests in Thompson’s
home.172 The Court reversed. Writing for five Justices, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist explained that the defendants’ claim straddled be-
tween that of an overnight guest who the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects and one “merely ‘legitimately on the premises’” who has no
167 The driver of the vehicle was apparently King’s former wife. See Choper, Kamisar, and
Tribe, The Supreme Court at 165 (remarks of Professor Kamisar) (cited in note 26).
168 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528–29, citing Oral Argument in Byrd at 48–49 (cited in note 44).
169 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528.
170 525 US 83 (1998).
171 Id at 86.
172 Id at 87, citing State v Carter, 569 NW2d 169, 174 (Minn 1997), quoting Rakas, 439 US
at 143.
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constitutional protection.173 Ultimately, the Court found that the
defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment
due to “the purely commercial nature of the transaction,” the “rela-
tively short period of time on the premises,” and their “lack of any
previous connection” with Thompson.174
If a right to exclude others matters for standing purposes, Car-
ter and Johns had a valid claim for Fourth Amendment protection.
Although Carter never mentions the issue, one could reasonably
conclude that Carter and Johns, as invitees, could have excluded a
vacuum-cleaner salesman or a trespasser seeking entry into the apart-
ment. As Justice Kennedy put it in Byrd, they “would be permitted
to exclude third parties from [the apartment], such as a [burglar],”175
while Thompson was out.
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that Byrd signals the
overruling of Rakas orCarter or undercuts their holdings. Rather, the
discussion is offered to illustrate that Byrd’s reliance on a right to
exclude to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy proves too
much yet too little. Of course, some might say that there were no
stops for coffee in Rakas or vacuum-cleaner salesmen in Carter. But
there was no carjacker in Byrd either.
c. do societal norms control?
In other parts of the opinion, Justice Kennedy focuses not on prop-
erty interests but on social norms. For example, he concludes that the
rental agreement was not voided by Byrd’s operating the car, and he
emphasizes that various restrictions in the agreement have no con-
nection with the privacy interests of drivers.176 Of course, social norms
often influence Fourth Amendment cases.177 Indeed, the “Court has
correctly reasoned that the ‘security’ protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment is not self-defining and takes its meaning from reasonable
173 Carter, 525 US at 91.
174 Id.
175 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528–29, citing Oral Argument in Byrd at 48–49 (cited in note 44).
176 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1529.
177 See, for example, Katz, 389 US at 352 (noting that persons who use pay phones are
entitled to assume that their conversations are not being recorded by the government; a
contrary result would ignore the “vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communications”); Olson, 495 US at 98–99 (explaining that staying overnight in
another’s home is a “longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable
by society”).
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expectations of privacy that the community’s shared way of life sus-
tains.”178 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, is scant on the social
norms that support the view that Byrd had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the rental car.
Are there social expectations or normative principles that support
the result in Byrd ? The law is well established that in routine cases
police are not permitted to search a car without probable cause.179 But
Byrd does not rest on that legal norm. If it had, the Court would have
issued a short opinion explaining that unauthorized drivers of rental
cars possess the same Fourth Amendment rights as other drivers.
Another possible answer is that everyone knows that unauthorized
drivers frequently drive rental cars. Yet, Justice Kennedy does not
mention or embrace this possible societal understanding as the basis
for Byrd. Nor does Justice Kennedy ground his holding on the norm
that Byrd’s lawful presence in the vehicle secured him constitutional
privacy. When pressed on the normative claim he was making,
counsel for Byrd stated that:
society recognizes that when you put your personal items in a locked
space, . . . you have an expectation of privacy regarding it. . . . If someone is
wrongfully present and creating a criminal act by being present, that’s
different. But the government concedes [Byrd] was not wrongfully present
in the car, he had his personal items locked in the trunk, and as an objective
matter, someone has a . . . reasonable expectation of privacy in those
circumstances.180
This answer sounds like a mixture of privacy and “legitimately on
[the] premises” norms, which was once enough to support Fourth
Amendment standing, but was disavowed in Rakas as being sufficient,
standing alone, to assert a Fourth Amendment interest.181 Byrd re-
affirms this aspect of Rakas.182
178 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of Presence Under the Fourth Amendment,
1999 Supreme Court Review 253, 274.
179 See Carroll v United States, 267 US 132 (1925); California v Acevedo, 500 US 565 (1991);
Justice Sotomayor was thinking about this norm when she asked during oral argument: “And
absent probable cause, there’s no right to search. So why are we here?” Oral Argument in
Byrd at 21–22 (cited in note 44).
180 Oral Argument in Byrd at 31–32 (cited in note 44).
181 Rakas, 439 US at 143–48.
182 “[I]t is also clear that legitimate presence on the premises of the place searched, standing
alone, is not enough to accord a reasonable expectation of privacy, because ‘it creates too
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.’ ” Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527, citing
Rakas, 439 US at 142.
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not substantively ap-
ply the traditional Katz test, which measures privacy rights by ask-
ing whether the claimant has a subjective expectation of privacy that
society deems reasonable. Even assuming Byrd thought he had a pri-
vacy interest in the car, why would society consider that expectation
reasonable? Does society endorse an unauthorized driver operating
a rental car? Or is this behavior reasonable because unauthorized
drivers frequently drive cars they should not? Neither proposition is
supported by a deep-seated societal understanding or any other ob-
vious form of societal consensus. As noted above, the only societal
norms or property interests remotely supportive of Byrd that were
offered by the Court were that he had his girlfriend’s permission to
drive the car, and he had a right to exclude third parties. Unfortu-
nately, Justice Kennedy does not provide a clear explanation for the
Byrd holding.183 Ultimately, lower courts will have to improvise when
deciding future cases raising issues related to Byrd.
III. The Consequences of Byrd
While the basis of Byrd ’s holding is undefined and “leaves a
little bit unclear what test lower courts should [be] applying” in future
cases,184 one immediate result of Byrd is clear: in future cases, the
typical unauthorized driver has standing to challenge a search of the
rental vehicle he is operating.185 Without saying so directly, Justice
Alito refused to join this interpretation of Byrd. Rather, he took the
position that “an unauthorized driver of a rental car is not always
barred from contesting a search of the vehicle.”186 Whether an un-
authorized driver could challenge a search, according to Alito, re-
quired consideration of multiple factors, including the provisions of
the rental agreement, the circumstances surrounding the rental, why
183 See Kerr, The Supreme Court Takes a Broad View (cited in note 92) (stating that Byrd’s
holding is “a bit difficult to pin down. . . . At times it sounds like not just property-like
concepts but actual property law—property’s right to exclude—that controls. . . . And at
other times, the Court seems to not be applying property law at all. . . . So which is it,
property? Social norms? . . . [T]he test itself isn’t clearly resolved in Byrd.”).
184 Id.
185 Lower courts have ruled that unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles have standing to
contest the legality of a seizure of the vehicles they are driving. United States v Starks, 769 F3d
83 (1st Cir 2014); United States v Worthon, 520 F2d 1173 (10th Cir 2008). See also Bradley
Michelsen, Comment, Think Twice Before Borrowing a Friend’s Rental Car: A Look at Fourth
Amendment Standing Analysis in United States v. Worthon, 34 Okla City U L Rev 263 (2009).
186 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1531 (Alito, J, concurring).
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he was driving the vehicle, any property interest the driver possessed,
and the lawfulness of the driver’s conduct in the jurisdiction where it
occurred.187 “What this [instruction] permits in a variety situations
is entirely unclear.”188 For example, how should police officers and
judges apply two of the considerations suggested by Alito—the cir-
cumstances surrounding the rental and why the driver is behind the
wheel? Answers to these questions will initially come from the un-
authorized driver and are obviously subject to manipulation or false-
hoods. For someone who favors workability and bright-line rules
regarding police searches of vehicles,189 Justice Alito’s position pro-
motes neither.
Byrd ’s holding mandates that in the run-of-the-mine case, an un-
authorized driver of a rental car will be afforded the same constitu-
tional protection as an authorized driver. Practically speaking, this is
important because of the potential impact to society. One amicus
brief informed the Court that there are “2.3 million rental cars cur-
rently in service” nationwide.190 Further, “as of 2014, there were es-
timated to be about 19,115 car-sharing” vehicles in the country “shared
by about 996,000 members.”191 Byrd means that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies even when unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles and
unregistered drivers of car-sharing programs take the wheel.
Moreover, the logic of Byrd is unlikely to be confined to cases
involving rental cars.192 One topic that Byrd may affect is whether a
defendant has standing to challenge the installation and use of a GPS
tracking device to locate a vehicle. In United States v Jones,193 the
Court unanimously agreed that this police conduct constituted a
187 Id.
188 Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 361 (2009) (Alito, J, dissenting).
189 See id at 360 (Alito, J, dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s ruling because it eliminates a
rule that was “relatively easy for police officers and judges to apply” and for adopting a test
that requires “case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking”).
190 ACLU Brief at ∗20 (cited in note 67).
191 Id at ∗21.
192 Orin Kerr thinks Byrd ’s analysis will impact the privacy protection afforded e-mail.
According to Kerr, lower courts have ruled that “terms of service can eliminate Fourth
Amendment rights that otherwise exist in a person’s e-mail.” Kerr believes that this view is
wrong because “terms of service can at most control who has third party consent rights rather
than who has a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail. Byrd ’s explanation of why the
terms of a rental contract don’t control expectations of privacy in a car seems custom-made to
bolster the argument that terms of service don’t control expectations of privacy in e-mail.”
Kerr, The Supreme Court Takes a Broad View (cited in note 92).
193 565 US 400 (2012).
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search under the Fourth Amendment, though the Justices were di-
vided as to why. Five Justices adopted a property-based trespass anal-
ysis and emphasized that the government “physically occupied prop-
erty for the purpose of obtaining information.”194 A different set of
five Justices appliedKatz to conclude that the defendant’s “reasonable
expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring
of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”195 Since Jones was an-
nounced, lower courts have grappled with who may contest GPS
installation and monitoring. As Professor Wayne LaFave has help-
fully explained, three categories of defendants have been afforded
standing by the lower courts:
(1) only those persons with a sufficient property interest in the vehicle at
the time of the initial “trespass” by which the GPS device was attached;
(2) only those persons using or with an interest in the vehicle at the time the
tracking information was obtained; or (3) only those persons qualifying in
both respects.196
Regarding the first category, lower courts have suggested that
unless a defendant has a property interest in a vehicle when police
attach a GPS device, that defendant lacks standing to contest the
installation.197 After Byrd, however, a defendant challenging instal-
lation of a GPS device would not need a formal property interest in
the vehicle or even proof that he is the regular driver of the vehicle.
Under Byrd, it is enough that the defendant has “lawful posses-
sion and control”198 at the time the GPS device is installed to merit
standing.
194 Id at 404.
195 Id at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring) (joining Justice Alito’s opinion that long-term GPS
monitoring constitutes a search); id at 430 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment) (explaining
that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy”).
196 LaFave, 6 Search and Seizure § 11.3(e) Pocket Part at 30 (2017–18) (cited in note 12).
197 See United States v Sparks, 711 F3d 58, 62 n 1 (1st Cir 2013) (dicta noting that Sparks
did not own the vehicle, “but was its usual driver”; “on the other hand, [Michaud] seems to
have had no equivalent interest in the” vehicle); United States v Hernandez, 647 F3d 216, 219
(5th Cir 2011) (concluding, before the decision in Jones, that defendant lacked standing to
challenge installation of GPS because the truck was registered to his brother, defendant was
not a regular driver and no proof that defendant had possessory interest in the house where
truck was located when the GPS was attached). But see People v LeFlore, 996 NE2d 678, 688
(Ill App 2013) (concluding that if the defendant borrowed the vehicle with his girlfriend’s
consent, he has standing to contest “the State’s use of the GPS device and any evidence
obtained from that use, despite not being in possession of the vehicle when the GPS device
was installed”).
198 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1524.
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When determining whether a defendant may challenge the mon-
itoring (as opposed to the installation) of a GPS device attached to a
vehicle, some lower courts have required that the defendant prove
that he was either operating the vehicle or had a possessory interest in
the vehicle at the time the tracking data are obtained. For example, in
United States v Gibson,199 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a de-
fendant lacked standing to challenge the use of a GPS tracking de-
vice to locate a vehicle on a particular day because he was neither the
driver nor a passenger in the vehicle and held no possessory interest
in the vehicle. Responding to the dissent’s argument that the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because
he had the status of a co-owner of the vehicle, the court emphasized
that the defendant failed to prove “that he had exclusive custody and
control of the [vehicle].”200 Requiring “exclusive custody and control”
of a vehicle to claim a legitimate privacy interest seems inconsistent
with Byrd. Certainly, Terrence Byrd did not have “exclusive custody
and control” of the rental car that he was not authorized to drive.
Byrd merely obtained the keys from a legitimate renter and drove
away. Under typical conditions, that is enough to establish standing,
notwithstanding the fact that Byrd could not bar the legitimate renter
or the rental company from regaining control of the vehicle.
Moreover, a strong argument can now made that “a passenger qua
passenger”201 has a reasonable expectation of privacy that the vehicle
he is traveling in is not subjected to GPS monitoring solely at the
discretion of the police. Decided five weeks after Byrd,United States v
Carpenter 202 leaves no doubt that an individual has a “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”203
Specifically, Carpenter held that “an individual maintains a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as
captured through [cell-site location information] CSLI.”204 And
199 708 F3d 1256 (11th Cir 2013).
200 Id at 1278 (explaining that defendant lacked a privacy interest in the vehicle “because he
was not the legal owner of the [vehicle], he has not established that he had exclusive custody
and control of the [vehicle], and he was neither a driver of, nor a passenger in, the [vehicle]
when it was searched”).
201 Rakas, 439 US at 148–49.
202 138 S Ct 2206 (2018).
203 Id at 2217.
204 Id.
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though the Justices inCarpenter debatedwhether CSLI data aremore
or less precise than GPS tracking information, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s opinion for the majority left no doubt that the constitutional
issue was not going to turn on which type of technology was more
accurate.205 Instead, what mattered was that the government’s access
to CSLI related to Carpenter “invaded Carpenter’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”206
Under Carpenter’s logic, even a mere passenger should have
standing to contest the use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle in
which he is traveling.207 To the extent that Rakas’s holding is in-
consistent with this position, then its holding—that legitimately
being inside a vehicle is not sufficient to establish standing to contest
a search of the vehicle—does not survive either Jones or Carpenter,
which have clearly refashioned and extended Fourth Amendment
protection. As explained by the Chief Justice, five Justices in Jones
concluded that GPS monitoring of a vehicle violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of persons who have a reasonable expectation of
privacy “in the whole of their physical movements.”208 Carpenter
reaffirmed that conclusion and extended constitutional protection to
the gathering of CSLI by the government. Nothing in the reasoning
of either Jones or Carpenter supports denying the protection of those
rulings to passengers.209 After Carpenter and Jones, “everyone inside
the car—everyone whose location becomes known” due to GPS mon-
itoring orCSLI data collection, should have standing.210 Put differently,
205 Id at 2210 (stating that “the rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more so-
phisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’ . . . [T]he accuracy of CSLI is
rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.”).
206 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
207 See, for example, Commonwealth v Rousseau, 990 NE2d 543, 553 (Mass 2013) (con-
cluding, before the Carpenter decision, under the state constitution that “the government’s
contemporaneous electronic monitoring of one’s coming and goings in public places invades
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy” even in the absence of a property interest in the
vehicle).
208 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217, citing Jones, 565 US at 430 (Alito, J, concurring in the
judgment); id at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
209 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Jones did not address Jones’s standing to challenge the in-
stallation of the GPS device on his wife’s vehicle. The government acknowledged that Jones
was “the exclusive driver” of the vehicle. Scalia did comment that while Jones was not the
owner of the vehicle, he “had at least the property rights of a bailee.” Jones, 565 US at 404 n 2.
210 See Orin Kerr, Does Fourth Amendment Standing Work Differently for Jones Trespass
Searches, Traditional Katz Searches, and Long-Term Katz Searches? (Volokh Conspiracy, Feb 14,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/9DTK-GU49 (“If the theory is about privacy rights in
one’s public physical location, not what is inside the car, I’m not sure that the standing
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the “seismic shifts in digital technology”211 and the government’s ability
to obtain vast amounts of personal information by using modern
technology have rendered Rakas’s view of a passenger’s privacy interest
obsolete in the twenty-first century.
IV. Conclusion
In the final section of his opinion, Justice Kennedy intimates
that we should have predicted the result in Byrd. “Though new, the
fact pattern here continues a well-traveled path in this Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.”212 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the Court’s
precedents support Byrd ’s holding “that the mere fact that a driver in
lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental
agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation
of privacy.”213 The Court’s precedents on standing are indeed “well-
traveled.” But that path is not clearly marked. The Court’s rulings
offer myriad directions and they lack guidance for judges and lawyers.
While Justice Kennedy wants us to think that the reasoning and
holding in Byrd is obvious, his opinion relies on property interests and
societal norms that are hardly evident.
Some current Justices and scholars insist that property law has had
and should continue to have an overriding influence in deciding
Fourth Amendment cases.214 Byrd regrettably follows that approach
when Justice Kennedy states that “property concepts” will guide the
analysis still focuses on rights to the inside of the car (as it traditionally does). Under the logic
of [ Justices Alito and Sotomayor in Jones] rationale, shouldn’t everyone inside the car—ev-
eryone whose location becomes known, have standing? Why should rights in the inside of the
car matter under the long-term search inquiry?”).
211 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
212 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1531.
213 Id.
214 See, for example, Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2239 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (“The concept
of security in property recognized by Locke and the English legal tradition appeared
throughout the materials that inspired the Fourth Amendment.”); William Baude and James
Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821, 1837–39
(2016) (noting that the key episodes in the historical development of the Fourth Amendment
focused on property law). In the context of a case addressing “conversational privacy,” the
Justice responsible for the Katz test, Justice John Harlan, urged his colleagues to “reject
traditional property concepts entirely, and reinterpret standing law in the light of the sub-
stantive principles developed in Katz.” Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 191 (1969)
(Harlan, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). For Harlan, that meant “[s]tanding
should be granted to every person who participates in a conversation he legitimately expects
will remain private—for it is such persons that Katz protects.” Id (footnote omitted).
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Court’s decision making.215 But property rights should not control
the meaning and scope of the Fourth Amendment. Orin Kerr has
convincingly shown that—over the course of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—concepts of property law have not been
decisive for the Court.216 And as a policy matter, property rights
should not control who has standing to invoke the Fourth Amend-
ment. Rather, the “capacity to claim the protection of the Amend-
ment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but
upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable ex-
pectation of freedom fromgovernmental intrusion.”217 As theCourt’s
precedents demonstrate, when the Justices rely upon property con-
cepts like a right to exclude third parties to decide who has standing,
inconsistent results and confusion are inevitable because officers in
the field cannot easily determine remote property interests. Accurate
measurement of property rights often requires extensive fact-finding
post hoc.
There was another “well-traveled path” available to the Court in
Byrd. Police cannot search a motorist’s vehicle unless probable cause
exists that the vehicle contains evidence of criminality. If Byrd’s
operation of the vehicle was not a crime, why should he not have the
same Fourth Amendment rights as other lawful drivers? The Court
could have ruled simpliciter that unauthorized drivers (who are not car
thieves) occupy the same seat as other drivers: police cannot search
their vehicles without probable cause. Period. No need to ponder
“property concepts”218 like a right to exclude third parties. If there is
no probable cause, there can be no search. That approach would have
avoided future confusion for police, judges, and the public. And it
would have promoted a traditional view of the Fourth Amendment:
police should not have “unbridled discretion” to invade the privacy
of motorists.219
215 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527.
216 Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 Supreme Court
Review 67, 69 (“To the extent the early cases reveal any consistent methodology, they suggest a
mix of property, privacy, and policy concerns not entirely dissimilar to those that have influenced
theKatz test.”); id at 87 (noting that despite claims made by the Justices in the 1960s, “the Court
had never held that ‘property interests control’ Fourth Amendment law. Property traditionally
had played a role in Fourth Amendment law, just as it continues to play a role today. But it was
never the exclusive test.”).
217 Mancusi v DeForte, 392 US 364, 368 (1968).
218 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1527.
219 Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 663, 648 (1979).
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